講題: Limited Attention, Share Repurchases, and Takeover Risk.
Abstract:
We hypothesize that bidders may be unaware of potential undervalued targets, and that announcing open market share repurchases (OMRs) to counter undervaluation brings repurchasing firms to bidders' attention, and makes them more likely to become takeover targets and face higher takeover risk, a systematic risk proposed by Cremers, Nair, and John (2009). Indeed, we find that repurchasing firms face higher takeover probability in the years following OMR announcements, and that the increase in takeover risk can largely explain post-OMR long-run abnormal returns documented in the literature. The increase in takeover risk is larger for more undervalued firms and for those that announce larger repurchase programs. Our results suggest that OMRs, which are used by many firms to distribute cash to shareholders to counter undervaluation, could make the firms more sensitive to takeover waves and raise their cost of equity capital.