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Activity day:2017-05-04
Published At：2017-05-04
Views:296
2017-05-04 updated
講者：陳俊廷教授（國立臺灣大學經濟系） 講者資訊：http://www.econ.ntu.edu.tw/zh_tw/people/faculty0/faculty1/%E9%99%B3-%E4%BF%8A%E5%BB%B7-49753103 題目：Coordination in Social Networks. 時間：2017年05月05日（五）13：20–16：20 地點：管理學院 一號館203室 報名網址： https://goo.gl/forms/nmAJGAcmnYhZVuRT2 摘要： I study a collective action problem in a setting of repeated protest games in which players know their neighbors’ inclination to participate as well as monitor their neighbors’ past actions. I show that, under some mild or necessary assumptions , there is a (weak) sequential equilibrium in which the ex-post efficient outcome repeats in the path when discount factor is sufficiently high. |
