活動起日：2022-12-14 發佈日期：2022-12-14 瀏覽數：361 2022-12-14 更新
講者姓名：林耕毅老師 (Naval Postgraduate School)
題目： Patrolling in Uniform or Undercover
摘要：Police cars patrol streets, security officers patrol museums, and soldiers patrol the perimeter of a military installation. If an attacker can hide and learn about the patrol pattern by observing patrollers going by, how does the attacker time his attack to avoid getting caught? How effective is patrolling in uniform compared with patrolling undercover? In this talk, I will present a two-person zero-sum Stackelberg game, in which a defender decides when to dispatch patrollers and how fast they move along the perimeter to maximize the probability of detecting an attack. Somewhat surprisingly, patrolling in uniform can be just as effective as patrolling undercover as long as the patrol pattern is randomized properly.
The materials will be based on the paper below, in case anyone is interested.