本系擬於 12/25 (五) 邀請香港城市大學的李惟明教授至本所進行專題演講，相關訊息如下：

時間: 12/25 (五) 10:30-12:00
地點: 管理學院一號館4樓405教室
講者: 李惟明教授
講題: How Can Independent Directors Destroy Value? Evidence from Their Interactions with Major Customers

Abstract:
Research on corporate boards focuses on the interactions between the directors and the chief executive officers (CEOs) and ignores other stakeholders, such as major customers. This paper fills that gap by exploring how board structure affects a firm’s business relations with its major customers. We use the Sarbanes Oxley Act of 2002 as an exogenous shock that causes board structure to change. We find that higher in board independence leads to lower market-to-book ratio in firms with high customer concentration. This is because a more independent board is more likely to cut a firm’s business relations with its major customers, which leads to higher operating expense. Such a relation is particularly strong when firm-specific information is difficult to obtain for independent directors. This paper is among the first to investigate how the directors interact with major customers, and our findings support the view that outsider-dominated boards are not optimal for all firms.