活動起日:2012-12-11
發佈日期:2012-12-11
瀏覽數:285
2017-02-12 更新
時間: 12/14 (五) 10:30-12:00 Using the 2008 financial crisis as an exogenous shock, this paper examines whether “excessive” CEO pay – above median industry adjusted CEO pay slice (CPS) developed by Bebchuk et al. (2011) – can be a proxy for CEO ability. We find that high CPS firmsexperienced lower increases in credit default swap spreads and lower declines in firm value (measured by Tobin’s q) during the Great Recession than low CPS firms. These findings are consistent with the CEO ability hypothesis that higher paid CEOs appear to navigate through troubled times better than lower paid CEOs but contradict the notion that CPS proxies only for the CEO rent extracting agency problem.
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